SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey() return 1 on success
and 0 on error. But only < 0 was checked which means that errors were
never caught.
Closes GH-10705.
The length of "output_handler" is supposed to be passed, but as sizeof
is used, the resulting number includes the NUL character, so the length
is off-by-one. Subtract one to pass the correct length.
Closes GH-10667.
In SessionHandler::gc, we use a virtual call to PS(default_mod)->s_gc to
call the gc implementation. That return value is checked against
FAILURE (-1).
One of the call targets of PS(default_mod)->s_gc is ps_gc_files().
ps_gc_files() calls to ps_files_cleanup_dir(). The latter function has
some error checks and outputs a notice if something goes wrong. In cases
of errors, the function returns 0. This means that the check in
SessionHandler::gc will misinterpret this as a success and report that 0
files have been *successfully* cleaned up. Fix it by returning -1 to
indicate something *did* go wrong.
Closes GH-10644.
On my system, with Tidy 5.7.45, I get the following error diff for two
tests:
002+ line 1 column 7 - Error: <asd> is not recognised!
002- line 1 column 7 - Error: <asd> is not recognized!
As we can see, the spelling of recognised is different. Use an EXPECTF
and %c to mitigate this issue.
Signed-off-by: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
pcre2_match() returns error codes < 0, but only the "no match" error
code was handled. Fix it by changing the check to >= 0.
Closes GH-10632
Signed-off-by: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
Parse errors were not reported for the default config, they were only
reported when explicitly another config was loaded.
This means that users may not be aware of errors in their configuration
and therefore the behaviour of Tidy might not be what they intended.
This patch fixes that issue by using a common function. In fact, the
check for -1 might be enough for the current implementation of Tidy, but
the Tidy docs say that any value other than 0 indicates an error.
So future errors might not be caught when just using an error code of -1.
Therefore, this also changes the error code checks of == -1 to < 0 and
== 1 to > 0.
Closes GH-10636
Signed-off-by: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
Fixes GH-10627
The php_mb_convert_encoding() function can return NULL on error, but
this case was not handled, which led to a NULL pointer dereference and
hence a crash.
Closes GH-10628
Signed-off-by: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
Commit 8bbd0952e5 added a check rejecting empty strings; in the
merge commiot 379d9a1cfc however it was changed to a NULL check,
one that did not make sense because ZSTR_VAL() is guaranteed to never
be NULL; the length check was accidently removed by that merge commit.
This bug was found by GCC's -Waddress warning:
ext/mbstring/mbstring.c:748:27: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the address of ‘val’ will never be NULL [-Waddress]
748 | if (!new_value || !ZSTR_VAL(new_value)) {
| ^
Closes GH-10532
Signed-off-by: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
The code was missing the handling for the RECV_VARIADIC instruction.
Additional regression test for GH-10623
Co-authored-by: Fabio Ivona <fabio.ivona@defstudio.it>
To prevent build failures like:
make: *** No rule to make target '/code/master/ext/json/php_json_scanner_defs.h', needed by 'ext/json/json_scanner.lo'. Stop.
Fix it by extending the array sizes by one character. As the input is
limited to the maximum path length, there will always be place to append
the slash. As the php_check_specific_open_basedir() simply uses the
strings to compare against each other, no new failures related to too
long paths are introduced.
We'll let the DOM and XML case handle a potentially too long path in the
library code.
PHP’s implementation of crypt_blowfish differs from the upstream Openwall
version by adding a “PHP Hack”, which allows one to cut short the BCrypt salt
by including a `$` character within the characters that represent the salt.
Hashes that are affected by the “PHP Hack” may erroneously validate any
password as valid when used with `password_verify` and when comparing the
return value of `crypt()` against the input.
The PHP Hack exists since the first version of PHP’s own crypt_blowfish
implementation that was added in 1e820eca02.
No clear reason is given for the PHP Hack’s existence. This commit removes it,
because BCrypt hashes containing a `$` character in their salt are not valid
BCrypt hashes.
