The cookie option parser uses a wrong offset to start scanning
attributes, causing cookie values containing substrings like
"path=" or "domain=" to be falsely matched as attributes.
close GH-21400
* uri: Rename `uri_recomposition_mode_t` to `php_uri_recomposition_mode`
* uri: Align the names of the `php_uri_recomposition_mode` values
* uri: Rename `uri_component_read_mode_t` to `php_uri_component_read_mode`
* uri: Align the names of the `php_uri_component_read_mode` values
* uri: Rename `uri_property_name_t` to `php_uri_property_name`
* uri: Align the names of the `php_uri_property_name` values
* uri: Rename `uri_property_handler_t` to `php_uri_property_handler`
* uri: Rename `uri_(read|write)_t` to `php_uri_property_handler_(read|write)`
* uri: Rename `php_uri_property_handler`’s `(read|write)_func` to `read|write`
The `_func` is implied by the data type and the name of the struct.
* uri: Rename `uri_parser_t` to `php_uri_parser`
* uri: Shorten the names of `php_uri_parser` fields
The `_uri` suffix is implied, because this is an URI parser.
By using the `zend_hash_*()` functions directly, we can benefit from the
precalculated hash value in the given `zend_string *uri_parser_name`. We need
to deconstify the parameter, since the function might calculate the hash, thus
modifying the `zend_string*`.
The code is already looking up the entry in the function table anyway,
so might as well use it directly.
This simplifies the code and avoids a redundant lookup.
* PHP-8.4:
Fix GH-18990, bug #81029, bug #47314: SOAP HTTP socket not closing on object destruction
Fix leak when path is too long in ZipArchive::extractTo()
curl: Remove incorrect string release on error
* PHP-8.3:
Fix GH-18990, bug #81029, bug #47314: SOAP HTTP socket not closing on object destruction
Fix leak when path is too long in ZipArchive::extractTo()
curl: Remove incorrect string release on error
Currently the resource is attached to the object and its refcount is
increased. This means that the refcount to the resource is 2 instead of
1 as expected. A refcount of 2 is necessary in the current code because
of how the error handling works: by using convert_to_null() the resource
actually goes to rc_dtor_func(), dropping its refcount to 1. So on error
the refcount is correct.
To solve the issue, let `stream` conceptually be a borrow of the
resource with refcount 1, and just use ZVAL_NULL() to prevent calling
rc_dtor_func() on the resource.
Closes GH-19001.
This code is modelled after how `http_fopen_wrapper.c` does things,
which apparently is just looping over the array and handling each string
the same way as if we passed a header string directly.
Also fixes a potential crash in `php_sdl.c` but without adding support
for header arrays there (yet) because the code is untested.
Closes GH-15817.
HTTP/1.1 does not require a single whitespace after the colon, and
SoapServer does implement HTTP/1.1. The header value is already correctly
whitespace-trimmed, so no behaviour change happens w.r.t. header values.
Closes GH-15793.
RFC 2617 and 7616 describe that for the "Authorization" header we should
not put the qop nor nc value inside quotes. This differs from the
WWW-Authenticate header, which may have been the source of the confusion
in the implementation. While the version with quotes seems to work fine
in some cases, clearly not all servers accept the non-standard form.
To fix the issue, simply removing the quotes of those two header fields
of the client request to be in line with the RFC suffices.
I refer further to example 3.5 in RFC 2617 and example 3.9.1 in
RFC 7616.
RFC 2617: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2617
RFC 7616: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7616
Closes GH-14328.
The naming of the userland functions is terrible and confused me.
gzdecode() is actually the function to decompress a gzip stream, and
gzuncompress() is the one to decompress a deflate stream...
See zlib.c to see the internal function -> type mapping.
The incorrect functions are being called to deal with incoming
compressed data.
gzip/x-gzip corresponds to gzuncompress(), while deflate corresponds to
gzinflate().
The existing code for gzip compression also plays with removing the
first 10 bytes (i.e. the gzip header) to pass it to the inflate
implementation but that doesn't always work properly due to trailer
data. Get rid of that entirely by using the correct functions.
Closes GH-14321.
This allows consumers of just the CSPRNG to include a much smaller header. It
also allows to verify at a glance whether a source file might use non-secure
randomness.
This commit includes the new header wherever the CSPRNG is used, possibly
replacing the inclusion of php_random.h if nothing else is used, but also
includes it in the main php_random.h header for compatibility.
Somewhat related to 45f8cfaf10,
2b30f18708, and
b14dd85dca.
If php_random_bytes_throw fails, the nonce will be uninitialized, but
still sent to the server. The client nonce is intended to protect
against a malicious server. See section 5.10 and 5.12 of RFC 7616 [1],
and bullet point 2 below.
Tim pointed out that even though it's the MD5 of the nonce that gets sent,
enumerating 31 bits is trivial. So we have still a stack information leak
of 31 bits.
Furthermore, Tim found the following issues:
* The small size of cnonce might cause the server to erroneously reject
a request due to a repeated (cnonce, nc) pair. As per the birthday
problem 31 bits of randomness will return a duplication with 50%
chance after less than 55000 requests and nc always starts counting at 1.
* The cnonce is intended to protect the client and password against a
malicious server that returns a constant server nonce where the server
precomputed a rainbow table between passwords and correct client response.
As storage is fairly cheap, a server could precompute the client responses
for (a subset of) client nonces and still have a chance of reversing the
client response with the same probability as the cnonce duplication.
Precomputing the rainbow table for all 2^31 cnonces increases the rainbow
table size by factor 2 billion, which is infeasible. But precomputing it
for 2^14 cnonces only increases the table size by factor 16k and the server
would still have a 10% chance of successfully reversing a password with a
single client request.
This patch fixes the issues by increasing the nonce size, and checking
the return value of php_random_bytes_throw(). In the process we also get
rid of the MD5 hashing of the nonce.
[1] RFC 7616: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616
Co-authored-by: Tim Düsterhus <timwolla@php.net>
