Nowadays, databases are cardinal components of any web based application by enabling websites to provide varying dynamic content. Since very sensitive or secret information can be stored in a database, you should strongly consider protecting your databases. To retrieve or to store any information you need to connect to the database, send a legitimate query, fetch the result, and close the connection. Nowadays, the commonly used query language in this interaction is the Structured Query Language (SQL). See how an attacker can tamper with an SQL query. As you can surmise, PHP cannot protect your database by itself. The following sections aim to be an introduction into the very basics of how to access and manipulate databases within PHP scripts. Keep in mind this simple rule: defense in depth. The more places you take action to increase the protection of your database, the less probability of an attacker succeeding in exposing or abusing any stored information. Good design of the database schema and the application deals with your greatest fears. The first step is always to create the database, unless you want to use one from a third party. When a database is created, it is assigned to an owner, who executed the creation statement. Usually, only the owner (or a superuser) can do anything with the objects in that database, and in order to allow other users to use it, privileges must be granted. Applications should never connect to the database as its owner or a superuser, because these users can execute any query at will, for example, modifying the schema (e.g. dropping tables) or deleting its entire content. You may create different database users for every aspect of your application with very limited rights to database objects. The most required privileges should be granted only, and avoid that the same user can interact with the database in different use cases. This means that if intruders gain access to your database using your applications credentials, they can only effect as many changes as your application can. You may want to establish the connections over SSL to encrypt client/server communications for increased security, or you can use ssh to encrypt the network connection between clients and the database server. If either of these is used, then monitoring your traffic and gaining information about your database will be difficult for a would-be attacker. SSL/SSH protects data travelling from the client to the server: SSL/SSH does not protect persistent data stored in a database. SSL is an on-the-wire protocol. Once an attacker gains access to your database directly (bypassing the webserver), stored sensitive data may be exposed or misused, unless the information is protected by the database itself. Encrypting the data is a good way to mitigate this threat, but very few databases offer this type of data encryption. The easiest way to work around this problem is to first create your own encryption package, and then use it from within your PHP scripts. PHP can assist you in this with several extensions, such as OpenSSL and Sodium, covering a wide variety of encryption algorithms. The script encrypts the data before inserting it into the database, and decrypts it when retrieving. See the references for further examples of how encryption works. In the case of truly hidden data, if its raw representation is not needed (i.e. will not be displayed), hashing should be taken into consideration. The well-known example for hashing is storing the cryptographic hash of a password in a database, instead of the password itself. The password functions provide a convenient way to hash sensitive data and work with these hashes. password_hash is used to hash a given string using the strongest algorithm currently available and password_verify checks whether the given password matches the hash stored in database. ]]> SQL injection is a technique where an attacker exploits flaws in application code responsible for building dynamic SQL queries. The attacker can gain access to privileged sections of the application, retrieve all information from the database, tamper with existing data, or even execute dangerous system-level commands on the database host. The vulnerability occurs when developers concatenate or interpolate arbitrary input in their SQL statements. In the following example, user input is directly interpolated into the SQL query allowing the attacker to gain a superuser account in the database. ]]> Normal users click on the 'next', 'prev' links where the $offset is encoded into the URL. The script expects that the incoming $offset is a number. However, what if someone tries to break in by appending the following to the URL If it happened, the script would present a superuser access to the attacker. Note that 0; is to supply a valid offset to the original query and to terminate it. It is a common technique to force the SQL parser to ignore the rest of the query written by the developer with -- which is the comment sign in SQL. A feasible way to gain passwords is to circumvent your search result pages. The only thing the attacker needs to do is to see if there are any submitted variables used in SQL statements which are not handled properly. These filters can be set commonly in a preceding form to customize WHERE, ORDER BY, LIMIT and OFFSET clauses in SELECT statements. If your database supports the UNION construct, the attacker may try to append an entire query to the original one to list passwords from an arbitrary table. It is strongly recommended to store only secure hashes of passwords instead of the passwords themselves. ]]> The static part of the query can be combined with another SELECT statement which reveals all passwords: UPDATE and INSERT statements are also susceptible to such attacks. ]]> If a malicious user submits the value ' or uid like'%admin% to $uid to change the admin's password, or simply sets $pwd to hehehe', trusted=100, admin='yes to gain more privileges, then the query will be twisted: ]]> While it remains obvious that an attacker must possess at least some knowledge of the database architecture to conduct a successful attack, obtaining this information is often very simple. For example, the code may be part of an open-source software and be publicly available. This information may also be divulged by closed-source code - even if it's encoded, obfuscated, or compiled - and even by your own code through the display of error messages. Other methods include the use of typical table and column names. For example, a login form that uses a 'users' table with column names 'id', 'username', and 'password'. A frightening example of how operating system-level commands can be accessed on some database hosts. ]]> If attacker submits the value a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD' -- to $prod, then the $query will be: ]]> MSSQL Server executes the SQL statements in the batch including a command to add a new user to the local accounts database. If this application were running as sa and the MSSQLSERVER service was running with sufficient privileges, the attacker would now have an account with which to access this machine. Some examples above are tied to a specific database server, but it does not mean that a similar attack is impossible against other products. Your database server may be similarly vulnerable in another manner. A funny example of the issues regarding SQL injection Image courtesy of xkcd The recommended way to avoid SQL injection is by binding all data via prepared statements. Using parameterized queries isn't enough to entirely avoid SQL injection, but it is the easiest and safest way to provide input to SQL statements. All dynamic data literals in WHERE, SET, and VALUES clauses must be replaced with placeholders. The actual data will be bound during the execution and sent separately from the SQL command. Parameter binding can only be used for data. Other dynamic parts of the SQL query must be filtered against a known list of allowed values. prepare("SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE ? ORDER BY price {$sortingOrder}"); // The value is provided with LIKE wildcards $stmt->execute(["%{$productId}%"]); ?> ]]> Prepared statements are provided by PDO, by MySQLi, and by other database libraries. SQL injection attacks are mainly based on exploiting the code not being written with security in mind. Never trust any input, especially from the client side, even though it comes from a select box, a hidden input field, or a cookie. The first example shows that such a simple query can cause disasters. A defense-in-depth strategy involves several good coding practices: Never connect to the database as a superuser or as the database owner. Use always customized users with minimal privileges. Check if the given input has the expected data type. PHP has a wide range of input validating functions, from the simplest ones found in Variable Functions and in Character Type Functions (e.g. is_numeric, ctype_digit respectively) and onwards to the Perl Compatible Regular Expressions support. If the application expects numerical input, consider verifying data with ctype_digit, silently change its type using settype, or use its numeric representation by sprintf. If the database layer doesn't support binding variables then quote each non-numeric user-supplied value that is passed to the database with the database-specific string escape function (e.g. mysql_real_escape_string, sqlite_escape_string, etc.). Generic functions like addslashes are useful only in a very specific environment (e.g. MySQL in a single-byte character set with disabled NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES), so it is better to avoid them. Do not print out any database-specific information, especially about the schema, by fair means or foul. See also Error Reporting and Error Handling and Logging Functions. Besides these, you benefit from logging queries either within your script or by the database itself, if it supports logging. Obviously, the logging is unable to prevent any harmful attempt, but it can be helpful to trace back which application has been circumvented. The log is not useful by itself but through the information it contains. More detail is generally better than less.